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Abstract 
I examine the problem of treatment choice when a 
planner observes (i) covariates that describe each 
member of a population of interest and (ii) the 
outcomes of an experiment in which subjects 
randomly drawn from this population are 
randomly assigned to treatment groups within 
which all subjects receive the same treatment. 
Covariate data for the subjects of the experiment 
are not available. The optimal treatment rule is to 
divide the population into subpopulations whose 
members share the same covariate value, and then 
to choose for each subpopulation a treatment that 
maximizes its mean outcome. However the 
planner cannot implement this rule. I draw on my 
work on nonparametric analysis of treatment 
response to address the planner's problem. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that a planner must choose a treatment rule 
assigning a treatment to each member of a heterogeneous 
population. Each person in the population has a response 
function mapping treatments into a real- valued outcome of 
interest. The planner wants to choose a treatment rule that 
maximizes the population mean outcome. 
The feasible treatment rules and the planner's ability to 
evaluate them depend on the information that the planner 
possesses about the members of the population. If the 
planner somehow observes or otherwise knows each 
person's response function, he can choose treatments that 
maximize each person's outcome. However response 
functions generally are neither completely observed nor a 
priori known. Hence we are concerned with situations in 
which less extensive information is available. 
This paper considers the problem of treatment choice when 
the planner has two types of empirical information about the 
population of interest. He observes (i) covariates that 
describe each member of the population and (ii) the 
outcomes of an experiment in which randomly drawn 
subjects are randomly assigned to treatment groups within 
which all subjects receive the same treatment. Covariate 
data for the subjects of the experiment are not available. 
Moreover, the planner has no observational (i.e., non­
experimental) data on treatment response. 
This informational situation is common in medical and 
other settings when new treatments are approved for use 
following a period of experimentation. Consider, for 
example, a physician who must choose treatments for a 
population of heterogeneous patients. Physicians 
commonly have extensive covariate information 
medical histories, diagnostic test fmdings, and demographic 
data - for the patients that they treat. Physicians often 
know the outcomes of randomized clinical trials evaluating 
new treatments. The medical journal articles that report the 
fmdings of clinical trials, however, do not usually report 
extensive covariate information for the subjects of the 
experiment. Medical researchers reporting on clinical trials 
usually describe outcomes only within broad risk- factor 
groups. 
A planner in the informational situation just described faces 
an interesting predicament. The optimal treatment rule 
given the observed covariates is to divide the population 
into subpopulations whose members share the same 
covariate value, and then to choose for each subpopulation 
a treatment that maximizes its mean outcome (see Section 
2.2). However the available experimental data only reveal 
mean outcomes in the population as a whole - the planner 
does not observe mean outcomes in each subpopulation. 
To address this problem, I draw on elements of my work on 
nonparametric analysis of treatment response. The 
methodological research program initiated in Manski (1989, 
1990) and carried forward in Manski (1993, 1994, 1995, 
1996, 1997a, 1997b) moves away from the longstanding 
focus of social scientists on exact identification of treatment 
effects. I have found that informative bounds on treatment 
effects may be obtained under various weak nonparametric 
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assumptions. Recently, in Manski (1998), I have begun to 
examine the implications of these fmdings for treatment 
choice. The present paper develops these implications in a 
specific setting of interest. 
Section 2 draws on Manski (1998) to develop general 
themes about the use of covariates in treatment choice. I 
show that an optimal treatment rule assigns to each member 
of the population a treatment that maximizes mean outcome 
conditional on the person's observed covariates. The 
planner is said to face a problem of treatment choice under 
uncertainty if he knows the conditional mean responses and, 
consequently, can implement an optimal rule. The planner 
is said to face a problem of treatment choice under 
ambiguity if he does not know enough about mean response 
to be able to implement an optimal rule. 
Section 3 examines the particular problem of treatment 
choice under ambiguity that arises when the planner 
observes experimental outcomes without accompanying 
covariate data. I focus on the simplest non-trivial case; that 
in which treatments, outcomes, and covariates are all binary. 
There are four feasible treatment rules in this setting; two 
rules assign the same treatment to all persons and two assign 
different treatments to persons with different covariate 
va�ues. I apply a fmding ofManski (1997a) to determine 
which of the four rules are dominated and, consequently, 
should not be chosen by the planner. It turns out that the 
dominated rules depends on a somewhat subtle interplay of 
the distribution of covariates in the population and the 
distributions of outcomes revealed by the randomized 
experiment. There are as many as three or as few as zero 
dominated treatment rules, depending on the configuration 
of these distributions. 
An empirical illustration helps to see the range of 
possibilities. Section 4 considers the situation of a planner, 
perhaps a social worker, who is charged with making 
preschool treatment choices for a population of children. 
The planner observes a binary covariate for each child. The 
planner observes the outcomes of a famous randomized 
experiment, the Perry Preschool Project, that assigned 
children to alternative preschool treatments. Application of 
the fmdings of Section 3 shows how the planner's ability to 
rank alternative treatment rules depends on the distribution 
of covariates in the population. 
Section 5 gives conclusions. 
2. USING COVARIATES TO CHOOSE 
TREATMENTS 
2.1. THE PLANNER'S CHOICE SET AND 
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
To formalize the problem of treatment choice, I suppose 
that the planner must choose a treatment rule assigning a 
treatment to each member of a specified population J. Each 
person j E J has an individual-specific response function 
yj(-): T- Y mapping the mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
treatments t e T into real-valued outcomes yj(t) e Y. A 
treatment rule is a function 't{-): J - T specifying which 
treatment each person receives; thus person j's outcome 
under rule 't"(-) is yj['t(j)]. 
The planner is concerned with the distribution of outcomes 
across the population, not with the experiences of particular 
individuals. With this in mind, I take the population to be 
a probability space, say (J, Q, P), where Q is the a-algebra 
on which probabilities are defmed and P is the probability 
measure. Now the population mean outcome under 
treatment rule -rO is 
(1) E{yi[-r(j)]} - f Yi[-r(j)]dP. 
I assume that the planner wants to choose a treatment rule 
that maximizes E{yi[ -r(j)]}. This criterion function has both 
normative and analytical appeal. Maximization of a 
population mean outcome, or perhaps some weighted 
average outcome, is the standard utilitarian criterion of the 
public economics literature on social planning. The 
linearity of the expectation operator yields substantial 
analytical simplifications, particularly through use of the 
law of iterated expectations. 
I suppose that the planner observes certain covariates xi e X 
for each member of the population. The planner cannot 
distinguish among persons with the same observed 
covariates. Hence he cannot implement treatment rules that 
systematically differentiate among these persons. With this 
in mind, I take the feasible rules be the set of functions 
mapping the observed covariates into treatments.1 
1 Although the planner cannot systematically differentiate among 
persons with the same observed covariates, he can randomly assign 
different treatments to such persons. Thus the set of feasible treatment 
rules in principle contains not only functions mapping covariates into 
treatments but also probability mixtures of these functions. Explicit 
consideration of randomized treatment rules would not substantively 
change the analysis of this paper, but would complicate the necessary 
notation. A simple implicit way to permit randomized rules is to include 
in x a component whose value is randomly drawn by the planner from 
some distribution. The planner can then make the chosen treatment vary 
with this covariate component. 
To formalize this, let Z denote the space of all functions 
mapping X into T. Then the feasible rules have the form 
(2) ,;G) = z(x), j E J, 
where z(·) E Z. The planner wants to solve the problem 
(3) max E{y[z(x)]}. 
z(-) e Z 
2.2. OPTIMAL TREATMENT CHOICE UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 
It is easy to show that the optimal choice among the set Z of 
feasible treatment rules assigns to each member of the 
population a treatment that maximizes mean outcome 
conditional on the person's observed covariates. For each 
z( ·) e Z, use the law of iterated expectations to write 
(4) E{y[z(x)]} = E{E{y[z(x)] I x}} 
E{ � E[y(t) l xJ-l[z(x)=t]}. 
t E T 
For each x eX, the bracketted expression on the right side 
is maximized by choosing z(x) to maximize E[y(t) I x] on 
t e T. Hence a treatment rule z·(·) is optimal if 
(5) z·(x) = argmax E[y(t) I x], x e X . 
te T 
The optimized population mean outcome is 
(6) v· - E{ max E[y(t) I x]}. 
t e T  
The planner is said to face a problem of treatment choice 
under uncertainty if he knows the conditional mean 
responses E[y(-) I x], x E X and, consequently, can 
implement the optimal treatment rule.2 It is easy to show 
2 The planner faces a problem of treatment choice under certainty 
if the outcome distributions P[y(·) I x], x EX are all degenerate. In this 
case, knowing E[y(·) I x], x EX means knowing each person's response 
function, with probability  one. 
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that in a problem of treatment under uncertainty, 
observation of the covariates x cannot decrease the 
population mean outcome achieved by the planner. 
Suppose that the planner were to observe only w(x), where 
w(·): X - W is a many-to-one function of x. Then the 
feasible treatment rules would be those that give the same 
treatment to each person with covariates w(x). These rules 
yield mean outcomes E[y(t)lw(x)], t E T; hence the 
optimized mean outcome is E{max te T E[y(t) lw(x)]}. With 
x observed, the optimized mean outcome is given in ( 6). By 
Jensen's Inequality, 
(7) E{max E[y(t) I x]} � E{max E[y(t) lw(x)]}. 
te T te T 
Hence the optimized mean outcome using covariates x to 
choose treatments is necessarily at least as large as that 
achievable using the more limited covariates w(x). 
2.3. UNDOMINATEDTREATMENTCHOICE UNDER 
AMBIGillTY 
The planner is said to face a problem of treatment choice 
under ambiguity if he does not know enough about the 
mean response functions E[y(·) I x], x E X to be able to 
implement the optimal treatment rule (5). 
Suppose the planner knows only that the population 
(covariate, response function) distribution P[x, y(·)] lies 
within a specified set ti> of possible (covariate, response 
function) distributions. The planner may then partition the 
feasible treatment rules into dominated and undominated 
subclasses. A feasible treatment rule zO is dominated if 
there exists another feasible rule, say z'(·), such that 
(Sa) f y[z(x)]d<l> ;5; f y[z'(x)]d<f>, all <!> e ti>, 
(8b) fy[z(x)]d<!> < fy[z'(x)]d<f>, some <I> e ti>. 
A treatment rule z( ·) is undominated if no such z' 0 exists. 
A planner facing a problem of treatment under ambiguity 
can eliminate dominated rules as sub-optimal but cannot 
rank the undominated rules.3 
3 Bayesian decision theorists suggest using subjective outcome 
distributions to rank undominated rules. Bayesians offer various 
procedural rationality arguments for this approach. These arguments do 
not, however, answer the question most relevant to the planner: How well 
does the rule perform? See Manski (1998, Section 2.1) for further 
discussion. 
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A generic feature of decision problems under ambiguity is 
that expansion of the choice set may decrease welfare. In 
the treatment-choice setting, the choice set is the space of 
functions mapping covariates into treatments, so 
observation of additional covariates implies expansion of 
the choice set. Observation of additional covariates enables 
the planner to choose a treatment rule that more finely 
differentiates among the members of the population. The 
problem is that the planner, not knowing mean outcomes 
conditional on these covariates, may unwittingly use them 
to choose a worse treatment rule. 
To see this, it suffices to consider the extreme case where 
the planner has no knowledge of P[x, y(·)], so tt> is the set 
of all (covariate, response function) distributions. In this 
case all feasible treatment rules are undominated and the 
planner may inadvertently choose the worst possible one. 
If only w(x) is observed, the feasible treatment rules give 
the same treatment to every person with covariates w(x). 
Then the worst possible rule yields E{min te r E[y(t) I w(x)]} 
as the population mean outcome. If x is observed, the 
feasible treatment rules give the same treatment to every 
person with covariates x. Now the worst possible rule 
yields E{min t e r E[y(t) I x]} as the population mean 
outcome. By Jensen's Inequality, 
(9) E{minE(y(t) i x]} s: E{minE[y(t)\w(x)]}. 
te T te T 
Hence using x to choose treatments may decrease the 
population mean outcome achieved by the planner. 
3. TREATMENT CHOICE WHEN 
TREATMENTS, OUTCOMES, AND 
COV ARIATES ARE BINARY 
3.1. THE PLANNER'S INFORMATION AND THE 
FEASIBLE TREATMENT RULES 
I now formalize the informational situation described in the 
Introduction. I assume that the planner has no prior 
information about treatment response; hence treatment 
choice must be based on the available empirical evidence 
alone. The planner observes the covariates x for each 
member of the population and therefore knows the covariate 
distribution P(x). The planner has no observational data on 
treatment response. He observes the outcomes of an 
experiment conducted on the population of interest, but 
does not observe covariates for the experimental subjects. 
I assume that the experiment achieves the classical ideal -
the subjects are randomly drawn from the population and 
are randomly assigned to treatments, all subjects comply 
with their treatments, there are no interactions among 
subjects, and so on. To keep attention focused on the 
identification problem that is at the heart of the planner's 
predicament, I assume that the samples of subjects are large 
enough that the planner may safely abstract from sampling 
variability when interpreting the empirical evidence. Then 
the experimental data reveal the outcome distributions 
P[y(t)], t E T. 
The planner's problem is to use the available empirical 
evidence to make treatment choices. A central feature of 
treatment choice under ambiguity is that the normative 
question "What treatment rule should the planner choose?" 
has no clear answer. However the normative question 
"What treatment rules should the planner not choose?" does 
have a clear answer. That is, the planner should not choose 
treatment rules that are dominated. Thus the planner's 
immediate problem is to determine the treatment rules that 
are dominated given the available information. 
To grasp the essence of the planner's problem, it suffices to 
consider the simplest non-trivial setting; that in which 
treatments, outcomes, and covariates are all binary. Thus I 
henceforth suppose that there are two treatments, say t = 0 
and t = 1. The outcome y(t) is binary, taking the values y(t) 
= 0 and y(t) = 1; hence E[y(t)\x] = P[y(t) = 1\x]. The 
covariate x is also binary, taking the values x = a and x = b. 
There are four feasible treatment rules in this setting. These 
rules and their mean outcomes are 
Treatment Rule -r(O. 0): All persons receive treatment 0. 
The mean outcome is M(O, 0) = P[y(O) = 1]. 
Treatment Rule -r{l. 1): All persons receive treatment 1. 
The mean outcome is M(1, 1) = P[y(1) = 1]. 
Treatment Rule -r(O. 1): Persons with x = a receive treatment 
0 and persons with x = b receive treatment 1. The mean 
outcome is 
M(O, 1) = P[y(O) = 1\x = a]"P(x =a) 
+ P[y(l) = 1\x = b]"P(x =b). 
Treatment Rule -r(l. 0): Persons with x =a receive treatment 
1 and persons with x = b receive treatment 0. The mean 
outcome is 
M(1, 0) = P[y(1) = 1\x = a]"P(x =a) 
+ P[y(O)=l\x=b]·P(x=b). 
3.2. THE DOMINATED TREATMENT RULES 
Which of the four feasible treatment rules are dominated? 
The experiment reveals M(O, 0) and M(l, 1) . Thus rule 
't"(O, 0) is dominated ifM(O, 0) < M(l, 1) and rule •(1, 1) is 
dominated ifM(l, 1) < M(O, 0) . The planner is indifferent 
between these two rules ifM(O, 0) = M(l, 1) . 
The experimental data do not reveal M(O, 1) and M(l, 0) . 
However, Manski (1997a, Proposition 7) shows that the 
experiment and the planner's knowledge of the covariate 
distribution imply sharp bounds on these quantities. The 
derivation begins from the fact that 
(l Oa) P[y(O) = 1] P[y(O) = ljx = a}P(x =a) 
+ P[y(O) = ljx = b}P(x =b) 
{lOb) P[y(l ) = 1] = P[y(l ) = ljx = a}P(x =a) 
+ P[y(l ) = ljx = b}P(x =b) . 
Consider (lOa) . The planner knows P[y(O) = 1] and P(x) . 
The unknowns P[y(O) = ljx =a] and P[y(O) = ljx = b] both 
lie in the interval [0, 1]. Hence (l Oa) yields informative 
sharp bounds on P[y(O) = ljx =a] and P[y(O) = ljx =b). 
Similarly, (l l b) yields bounds on P[y(l ) = ljx = a] and 
P[y(l) = ljx = b]. The sharp bounds on M(O,l ) and M(l, 0) 
then follow immediately. These turn out to be 
(lla) max {0, P[y(l ) = 1]- P(x =a) } 
+ max {0, P[y(O) = 1]- P(x =b) } 
� M(O, 1) 
� min {P(x =b) , P[y(1) = 1]} 
+min {P(x =a) , P[y(O) = 1]} 
(11b) max {0, P[y(l) = 1]- P(x =b) } 
+ max {0, P[y(O) = 1]- P(x =a) } 
� M(l, 0) 
� min {P(x =a) , P[y(l ) = 1]} 
+min {P(x =b) , P[y(O) = 1]}. 
It might have been conjectured that M(O, 1) and M(l , 0) 
must lie in the interval [M(O, 0) , M(1, 1) ]. This is correct if 
treatment 0 is inferior to treatment 1 in subpopulations 
{x =a} and {x = b}; that is, if P[y(O) = ljx =a] � P[y(l ) 
= 1jx = a] and P[y(O) = 1jx =b] � P[y(l) = ljx = b). 
However the conjecture is not correct if the ordering of the 
mean outcomes differs across the two subpopulations. It is 
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this possibility that gives rise to the surprisingly complex 
bounds on M(O, 1) and M(1, 0) reported in (11) . 
The form of the bounds depends on the ordering of 
P[y(O) = 1], P[y(1) = 1], P(x =a) , and P(x =b) . Henceforth 
I assume without loss of generality that P[y(O) = 1] � 
P[y(1) = 1] and P(x =a) � P(x =b) . Then there are six 
distinct orderings to be considered. For each one, 
application of (11a) and (l l b) yields the bounds on M(O, 1) 
and M(1, 0) . These bounds determine which treatment rules 
are dominated. The results follow: (Rule •(0, 0) is 
dominated if P[y(O) = 1] < P[y(l ) = 1]. I do not repeat 
this below.) 
Case 1: P[y(O) = 1] � P[y(1) = 1] � P(x =a) � P(x =b) 
0 � M(O, 1) � P[y(1) = 1] + P[y(O) = 1]. 
0 � M(l, 0) � P[y(l ) = 1] + P[y(O) = 1]. 
Rules •(0, 1) , 1:(1, 0) , and T(l , 1) are undominated. 
Case 2: P[y(O) = 1] � P(x =a) � P[y(l) = 1] � P(x =b) 
P[y(1) = 1]- P(x =a) � M(O, 1) 
� P[y(1) = 1] + P[y(O) = 1]. 
0 � M(l, 0) � P(x =a) + P[y(O) = 1]. 
Rules •(0, 1) and •(1, 1) are undominated. Rule •(1, 0) is 
dominated if P(x =a) + P[y(O) = 1] < P[y(1) = 1]. 
Case 3: P[y(O) = 1] � P(x =a) � P(x =b) � P[y(1) = 1] 
P[y(1) = 1]- P(x =a) � M(O, 1) 
� P(x =b) + P[y(O) = 1]. 
P[y(l ) = 1]- P(x =b) � M(1, 0) 
� P(x =a) + P[y(O) = 1]. 
Rule •(1, 1) is undominated. Rule •(0, 1) is dominated if 
P(x = b) + P[y(O) = 1] < P[y(1) = 1]. Rule 1:{1, 0) is 
dominated if P(x =a) + P[y(O) = 1] < P[y(1) = 1]. 
Case4: P(x=a) � P[y(O) =l] � P[y(l) =1]s P(x=b) 
P[y(l ) = 1]- P(x =a) � M(O, 1) 
� P[y(l) = 1] + P(x =a) . 
P[y(O) = 1]- P(x =a) � M(l, 0) 
� P(x =a) + P[y(O) = 1]. 
Rules •{1, 1) and •(0, 1) are undominated. Rule 1:{l, 0) is 
dominated if P(x =a) + P[y(O) = 1] < P[y(1) = 1]. 
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Case 5: P(x =a) � P[y(O) = 1] � P(x =b) � P[y(l) = 1] 
P[y(1) = 1]-P(x =a) � M(O, 1) � 1. 
P[y(1) = 1] + P[y(O) = 1] - 1 � M(1, 0) 
!> P(x =a) + P[y(O) = 1]. 
Rules 1:(1, 1) and 't(O, 1) are undominated. Rule 1:(1, 0) is 
dominated if P(x =a) + P[y(O) = 1] < P[y(1) = 1]. 
Case 6: P(x=a) !> P(x=b) � P[y(0)=1] !> P[y(1)=1] 
P[y(1) = 1] + P[y(O) = 1] - 1 � M(O, 1) � 1. 
P[y(1) = 1] + P[y(O) = 1] - 1 � M(1, 0) !> 1. 
Rules 't(O, 1), 1:(1, 0), and 1:(1, 1) are undominated. 
Cases 1 through 6 show that as many as three or as few as 
zero treatment rules are dominated, depending on the 
empirical values ofP[y(O) = 1], P[y(1) = 1], P(x =a), and 
P(x =b). The one constancy is that rule 't(l, 1) is always 
undominated; indeed, 't(l, 1) is always the maximin rule. 
I would emphasize that 1:( 1, 1) need not be the optimal rule. 
The fact that 1:( 1, 1) is always undominated simply means 
that, given the available information, the planner cannot 
reject the hypothesis that 't(1, 1) is the optimal rule. 
4. AN EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION: THE 
PERRY PRESCHOOL PROJECT 
An empirical illustration helps to see the range of 
possibilities. Beginning in 1962, the Perry Preschool 
Project provided intensive educational and social services to 
a random sample of low-income black children in Ypsilanti, 
Michigan. The project investigators also drew a second 
random sample of such children, but provided them with no 
special services. Subsequently, it was found that 67 percent 
of the treatment group and 49 percent of the control group 
were high-school graduates by age 19 (see Berrueta­
Clement et al. (1984)). 
Let t = 1 denote the Perry Preschool treatment and t = 0 
denote the "no special services" control treatment. Let y(t) 
= 1 if a child receiving treatment t is a high school graduate 
by age 19 and y(t) = 0 otherwise. Abstracting from 
sampling variability and ignoring some attrition from the 
experiment, the outcome data reveal that P[y(O) = 1] = 
0.49 andP[y(1) = 1] = 0.67. 
Consider the situation of a planner, perhaps a social worker, 
who is charged with making preschool treatment choices for 
low-income black children in Ypsilanti and whose objective 
is to maximize the high school graduation rate. The 
planner can assign each child to the Perry Preschool 
treatment or not. Suppose that the planner observes a 
binary covariate that describes each member of the 
population. For the sake of concreteness, let the covariate 
indicate the child's family status, with x =a if the child has 
an intact two-parent family and x = b otherwise. 
The available outcome data reveal that treatment rule 
't(O, 0), wherein no children receive the Perry Preschool 
treatment, is dominated by rule 1:(1, 1), wherein all children 
receive preschooling. The conclusions that the planner can 
draw about rules 't(O, 1) and 1:(1, 0) depend on the covariate 
distribution P(x). 
Suppose that half of all children have intact families, so 
P(x=a) = P(x=b) = 0.5. ThenCase 3 ofSection 3.2 
holds. The bounds on mean outcomes under rules 't(O, 1) 
and 1:(1, 0) are 
0.17 � M(O, 1) � 0.99 0.17 !> M(1, 0) � 0.99. 
These bounds imply that rules 't(O, 1) and 1:(1, 0), which 
reverse one another's treatment assignments, have an 
enormously wide range of potential consequences for high 
school graduation. The best case for -r(O, 1) and the worst 
for 1:(1, 0) both occur if the (unknown) graduation 
probabilities conditional on covariates are 
P[y(O) = 1lx =a] = 0.98 P[y(1) = 1lx =a] = 0.34 
P[y(0)=1ix=b] = 0 P[y(1)"=1ix=b] = 1. 
These graduation probabilities, which yield M(O, 1) = 0.99 
and M(l, 0) = 0.17, are consistent with the experimental 
evidence that P[y(O) = 1] = 0.49 and P[y(l) = 1] = 0.67. 
They describe a possible world in which preschooling is 
necessary and sufficient for children in non-intact families 
to complete high school, but substantially hurts the 
graduation prospects of children in intact families. There is 
another possible world with the reverse graduation 
probabilities, one in which M(O, 1) = 0.17 and M(l, 0) = 
0.99. Hence rules 't(O, 1), 1:(1, 0), and 't(1, 1) are all 
undominated. 
The planner faces a much less ambiguous choice problem 
if most children have non-intact families. Suppose that 
P(x =a) = 0.1 and P(x = b) = 0.9. Then Case 4 of 
Section 3.2 holds. The bounds on mean outcomes under 
rules 't(O, 1) and 't(1, 0) are 
0.57 !> M(O, 1) � 0.77 0.39 � M(1, 0) � 0.59. 
These bounds are much narrower than those obtained when 
half of all children have non-intact families. The upper 
bound on M(1, 0) is 0.59, which is less than the known 
value ofM(1, 1), namely 0.67. Hence treatment rule -r(l, 0) 
is dominated. Recall that rule 't(O, 0) is also dominated. 
Thus, although the planner does not observe graduation 
probabilities conditional on covariates, he can nevertheless 
conclude that the 90 percent of children who have non­
intact families should receive preschooling. The only 
ambiguity about treatment choice concerns the 10 percent 
of children who have intact families. Treatment rules 
't(O, 1) and 1(1, 1) are undominated. Thus, given the 
information available, the planner cannot determine whether 
these children should or should not receive preschooling. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In principle, the informational problem analyzed in this 
paper would disappear if researchers performing 
randomized experiments would collect extensive covariate 
data for their subjects and report outcome distributions 
conditional on these covariates. There seem to be two 
reasons why researchers commonly report experimental 
outcomes without much covariate information. 
First, researchers often seem to assume that treatment 
effects are constant across the population, or at least that 
they do not vary in sign across different subpopulations. (I 
say "seem to" because the assumption is commonly 
implicit, not explicit.) Given two treatments t = 0 and t = 1, 
suppose one knows a priori that there are only these two 
possibilities:either{E[y(1)lx] � E[y(O)Ix], all xEX}or 
{E[y(l )lx] ::; E[y(O)Ix], all x EX}. Then collection of 
data on the covariate x is not necessary to determine an 
optimal treatment rule. It suffices to learn if E[y(1)] 
exceeds E[y(O)]. 
Second, there is the matter of sampling variability. 
Researchers often perform randomized experiments with 
samples of subjects that are large enough to yield 
statistically precise fmdings for unconditional mean 
outcomes but not large enough to yield precise fmdings for 
mean outcomes conditional on covariates. Findings 
conditional on covariates commonly go umeported if they 
do not meet conventional criteria for statistical precision. 
Whatever the reasons are for the dearth of covariate data in 
reports of randomized experiments, the implications for 
treatment choice are clear. A planner who observes 
covariates that describe each member of the population can 
choose treatment rules that differentiate among persons with 
different covariate values. Lacking knowledge of mean 
outcomes conditional on the observed covariates, the 
planner generically faces a problem of treatment choice 
under ambiguity. Except in special circumstances (e.g., the 
subcase of Case 3 in which three of the four feasible rules 
are dominated), the planner cannot determine whether using 
the observed covariates to choose treatments improves or 
degrades the quality of decision making. This places the 
planner in an interesting, if disquieting, predicament. I 
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cannot say how actual planners - physicians, social 
workers, etc. - cope with this predicament in practice. 
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